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I. INTRODUCTION
According to the 2004-2005 United States Census Bureau Statistical Abstract of
the United States, Americans identify with at least thirty-five different self-described
Christian religious groups.1 Of those Christian groups, there are at least four that
have special tenets regarding medical treatment that are central to their religious
+

Winner of the Journal of Law and Health’s Best Note Award, 2006.

1

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005, NO.
67, SELF-DESCRIBED RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF ADULT POPULATION: 1990 AND 2001 55
(2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/04statab/pop.pdf.
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beliefs. Together, members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, Church of God, Pentecostal
Free Will Baptist Church, and Christian Science Church constitute slightly more than
four-and-a-half percent of the United States’s total population.2
Jehovah’s Witnesses represent the most well known group with such prohibitions
on their members’ conduct. This group recognizes the importance of modern
medicine, and its members receive treatment as most Americans do, with one
exception:3 Jehovah’s Witnesses believe it is a sin to receive a blood transfusion,
including one’s own recycled blood,4 or to use most types of blood products.5
Abstaining from these treatments is so important to Jehovah’s Witnesses that most of
them carry a medical emergency card indicating they explicitly do not consent to
such treatment should they be unable to be consulted in the event such treatment may
be deemed necessary.6 The Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution
requires physicians to respect this request.7
Unlike the Jehovah’s Witnesses, some other religious groups have a different
view. Specifically, Christian Scientists believe that faith healing is the only true

2
Id. These four minority Christian religions comprise a greater percentage than all nonChristian religions in the United States combined, including Jews, Muslims, Buddhists,
Hindus, the Native American Church, and Scientologists. Id.
3

Jehovah’s Witnesses Official Web Site, http://www.watchtower.org/medical_care_and_
blood.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2006).
4
J.L. Dixon & M.G. Smalley, Jehovah’s Witnesses: The Surgical/Ethical Challenge, 246
JAMA 2471, 2472 (1981), available at http://www.watchtower.org/library/hb/article_06.htm.
Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse “transfusion of whole blood, packed RBCs, and plasma, as well as
WBC and platelet administration.” Id. This tenet is based on scripture in Genesis 9:3-4:
“Only flesh with its soul—its blood—you must not eat,” and Acts 15:19-21: “Abstain from . . .
fornication and from what is strangled and from blood.” Id.
5
Recent changes in the church have led to reclassification of several blood products.
Wikipedia, Jehovah's Witnesses and Blood Transfusions, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Jehovah's_Witnesses_and_blood.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2006). So, while there is still a
direct ban that will result in disfellowshipping and shunning from other members of the
society if a Witness accepts red or white cells, platelets, or plasma, members must respect
Witnesses who decide to use products composed of fractions of red or white cells, platelets, or
plasma (including hemoglobin based substitutes, interferons, interleukins, albumin, globulins,
clotting factors, and wound healing factors). Associated Jehovah’s Witnesses for Reform on
Blood, http://www.ajwrb.org/review6-15-04.shtml (last visited Aug. 5, 2006). The Society
considers accepting these products as a personal decision each Witness must make after
careful prayer and meditation. Id.
6
Jehovah’s Witnesses Official Web Site, http://www.watchtower.org/library/hb/article
_04.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2006). There has been extensive litigation over whether hospitals
have an obligation to do whatever it takes to save patients, regardless of their religious beliefs.
The law is clear that it is an infringement on one’s Free Exercise Clause rights if a hospital or
physician is aware of an adult’s religious beliefs but does not respect the patient’s wishes. See
Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Patient’s Right to Refuse Treatment Allegedly Necessary to Sustain
Life, 93 A.L.R. 3D 67 (2005). The issue is still hotly debated when medical decisions involve
children. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 161 (2004).
7

See e.g., Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.E.1990).
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medicine.8 Members of this group believe prayer is the best treatment for ailments.9
Members can pray for themselves or may call upon a Christian Science practitioner
for prayerful assistance.10
The Pentecostal Free Will Baptist Church (PFWBC) is another minority
Christian group that believes in divine healing. This faith believes that “the Bible
teaches that the healing provided in the atonement is both spiritual and physical.”11
Members of the PFWBC believe “it is God’s highest will for His people to anoint,
lay hands on, and pray for the healing of the sick.”12 Nevertheless, although this
faith believes “the Bible teaches that there is nothing morally wrong with taking
medicine, or receiving human aid, if one is not able to fully trust the Lord,”13 by
receiving medical treatment, the logical conclusion is that one who accepts such
treatment does not fully trust the Lord.
Unfortunately, even though the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution14 was designed on our founders’ beliefs that religious freedom and the
freedom to exercise one’s religion were of chief importance,15 our courts
systematically discriminate against members of these minority Christian religions for
exercising those very rights.16 While it is commonly accepted that individuals have
the right to practice these medically restrictive tenets,17 courts still punish plaintiffs
by forcing them, when tortiously injured, to choose between what the majority
considers “reasonable” and their own religious convictions.18
The public policy behind the mitigation of damages doctrine is sound, but it
should not apply when something as sacred as the right to exercise one’s religion is
involved. The doctrine intends to discourage wasted resources and to promote the
least possible loss.19 Nevertheless, the doctrine does not properly take into account
8

MARY BAKER EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH
Church of Christ, Scientist 1994) (1875).

WITH

KEY

TO THE

SCRIPTURES 157 (First

9

Religious Tolerance: Church Beliefs, http://www.religioustolerance.org/cr_sci.htm (last
visited Oct. 30, 2006). Christian Scientists do find it acceptable, however, to have bones set,
cuts stitched, and teeth worked on by a dentist. DEWITT JOHN, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE WAY
OF LIFE 127-28 (1962).
10
Religious Tolerance: Church Beliefs, http://www.religioustolerance.org/cr_sci.htm (last
visited Oct. 30, 2006).
11
Faith and Practices of the Pentecostal Free Will Baptist Church, Inc., http://www.pfwb.
org/faithpractices.htm#faithart9 (last visited Oct. 30, 2006).
12

Id.

13

Id.

14

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15

United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).

16

See, e.g., Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991) (Rubin, J., dissenting); Williams
v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (Rosenberger, J., dissenting).
17

See supra text accompanying note 6.

18

See infra Part III.B.

19

See infra note 29.
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the personal loss a plaintiff is forced to accept by violating his religious beliefs in
order to receive a full damage award. Instead, applying the doctrine only encourages
courts to judge the religious beliefs of a plaintiff on a “reasonableness” standard,
which is distinctly prohibited by the First Amendment.
Courts should end discrimination against minority religions by considering
plaintiffs who profess such beliefs as plaintiffs with a pre-existing condition
consisting of those beliefs. This way, the pre-existing condition doctrine could be
incorporated to provide some protection for such plaintiffs, ending their struggle
between doing what their religious beliefs tell them is right and receiving just
compensation for tortious injuries.
These plaintiffs are not seeking extra
compensation for their injuries. Rather, they seek permission to exercise their
religious beliefs while being made whole as tort law enables other plaintiffs to be
made whole.
The decisions an injured plaintiff must make in these kinds of cases are not a
matter of purposefully failing to receive medical treatment just to reap greater
damage awards. Negligent conduct leaves these plaintiffs with crippling injuries,20
lasting pain,21 or even worse: many have lost their lives from blood loss.22 Money is
not the basis of their decision—following the mandates of their religion is the basis
of their decision. These plaintiffs do not sit idly by in anticipation of their damage
award, hoping to endure further suffering so to be awarded more money. They are
often faced with the awful choice of either living with the knowledge that they have
sinned 23 or dying24 because of their beliefs. The purpose of such a cause of action is
to make the plaintiff whole. The negligent action of the defendant, and only that
negligent action, put the plaintiff in the position where this choice was necessary.
So, why is it that courts tolerate such discrimination?
Addressing this quandary, in Part II, this note discusses the background of the
mitigation of damages doctrine. Next, it explores case history exemplifying the
treatment of religion regarding this doctrine. It examines two primary cases
illustrating how courts treat plaintiffs who make such a religious choice, as well as
several cases that deal with individualized assessment for the receipt of government
benefits. This section concludes with a discussion about why the current law does
not work to truly protect the rights of plaintiffs forced into such difficult decisions by
tortious defendants.
Part III discusses the thin-skull plaintiff doctrine in-depth and examines the
different types of recognized pre-existing conditions. Next, this section presents
studies on how the brain processes religion and how each individual’s genetic
20

See, e.g., Christianson v. Hollings, 112 P.2d 723 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).

21

See, e.g., Montgomery v. Bd. of Ret., 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).

22

See, e.g., Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991).

23

Sometimes the possibility that one may be shunned or excommunicated because of such
a decision is a risk individuals with religious beliefs must face as well. See, e.g., Carol
Harrington, Father Shunned by Family for Defying Faith to Save Child, TORONTO STAR, Mar.
11, 2002, at A7.
24
Not only dying, but also living with a condition causing chronic pain, some type of
disability, or shortened life expectancy, etc. that a doctor believes internal surgery could
alleviate.
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makeup influences one’s beliefs. This research gives courts even more incentive to
consider religious beliefs as a pre-existing condition.
Part IV analyzes how and why courts should apply the doctrine of pre-existing
conditions to religious beliefs. It discusses how courts already recognize
conscientious objectors to war and provide them with a religious exemption to
combative duty and how considering religious beliefs as a pre-existing condition is
consistent with this practice. In addition, this section illustrates how treating
religious beliefs as a pre-existing condition will be consistent with three major cases
the United States Supreme Court has issued as guideposts for dealing with First
Amendment rights in situations of this nature.
Part V concludes that the ability to exercise one’s religious beliefs is too
important to be swept up in the mitigation of damages doctrine when the public
policy reasons behind the doctrine are simply meant to prevent waste. Instead,
courts should use tools already at hand to offer First Amendment protections to
plaintiffs by requiring a defendant to take his victim, as a whole, as he finds him.
Religious beliefs cannot be separated from the man simply because they are not what
the majority believes is reasonable. Our country was founded upon that basic
principle, and to do otherwise allows the majority to impose forbidden value
judgments upon minorities.
II. CASE AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF ISSUE
The basic premise underlying the mitigation of damages doctrine is to prevent
waste, specifically, to prevent a plaintiff from incurring greater injury from the tort
than is necessary given the specific circumstances of each case.25 Still, this doctrine
is not unlimited; a plaintiff is only required to act “reasonably” and generally is not
required to go to extremes or do anything in conflict with his personal morals.26
Nevertheless, courts still find a plaintiff who made a choice based on his religious
beliefs acted “unreasonably” according to the doctrine of mitigation of damages
when his choice was different from that which someone without his beliefs would
have made if that person’s choice would have resulted in less injury to the plaintiff.27
A. Background on the Mitigation of Damages Doctrine and Religious Choices
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states the doctrine of mitigation of damages
concisely: “One injured by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for
any harm that he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort or expenditure
after the commission of the tort.”28 The Restatement goes on to explain the
reasoning behind this rule: “Recovery for the harm is denied because it is in part the
result of the injured person’s lack of care, and public policy requires that persons

25

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. a (1979).

26

Id. at cmt. c.

27

See infra Part III.B.

28

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. j (1979) (“Thus when a water company
illegally refuses to turn on water unless the plaintiff pays a substantial bill that he does not
owe and agrees not to sue for the return of the money, a customer who refuses to pay the bill is
entitled to recover for the harm caused by the lack of water, even though he had the money
and, if he had paid, would have been entitled to restitution because of the duress.”).
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should be discouraged from wasting their resources, both physical or economic.”29
Thus, the general damages rule is that “[i]f harm results because of [the plaintiff’s]
careless failure to make substantial efforts . . . the damages for the harm suffered are
reduced to the value of the efforts he should have made . . . in addition to the harm
previously caused.”30 The burden of proof is on the defendant to prove that
aggravation of the condition resulted from the plaintiff’s failure to seek or to follow
medical advice.31
To determine whether an injured plaintiff has taken reasonable action to mitigate
his damages, courts consider the plaintiff’s “physical and mental condition after an
injury.”32 The plaintiff is under a “duty to use ordinary care in following [medical]
advice,” and “damages may be decreased . . . if, but only if, a reasonably prudent
person would have followed the medical advice given, and if the failure of the
plaintiff to do so causes a worsening of his . . . condition.”33 Additionally, “[a]
person is not ordinarily required to surrender a right of substantial value in order to
minimize loss.”34 Nevertheless, this part of the rule does not apply to religious
beliefs.35
Generally, a plaintiff is not required to go to extremes to mitigate his damages:
“It is frequently reasonable for a person threatened by further harm from a tortious
act to refuse to subject himself to pain or to a danger of a different kind, which it
would be necessary to undergo if the further harm is to be averted.”36 Courts have
interpreted “pain or . . . danger of a different kind” to mean that injured plaintiffs
need not subject themselves to extremely dangerous37 surgeries, extremely painful
treatment,38 or treatment that will be unlikely to significantly improve their
condition.39 Conversely, courts have held that failure to mitigate damages because of

29

Id. at cmt. a; see also, 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 371 (2004) (“A plaintiff cannot refuse
treatment and then claim damages for conditions resulting from that refusal.”).
30

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. b (1979).

31

3 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS (MB) § 16.03 (2005).

32

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. c (1979).

33

22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 371 (2004).

34

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. j (1979).

35

Gary Knapp, Refusal of Medical Treatment on Religious Grounds as Affecting Right to
Recover for Personal Injury or Death, 3 A.L.R. 5th 721 (2004).
36

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. d (1979).

37

22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 374 (2004).

38

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. d (1979).

39

22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 373 (2004) (“[I]f the proposed treatment could result in the
aggravation of an existing condition or the development of an additional condition of ill
health, or if the prospect for improved health is slight, then there should be no duty to undergo
treatment.”); see also id. at § 375 (“A plaintiff will not be charged with lack of care for failing
to obtain a particular treatment if there is conflicting medical testimony as to the probability of
a cure, or if a surgeon was only recommending exploratory surgery that appeared to be
worthwhile to try.”).
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religious beliefs,40 laziness,41 or a belief that the tortfeasor will be liable for all costs42
is within the scope of action a plaintiff is liable for himself. Then, his award is
reduced to the extent that he did not mitigate his damages under the given
circumstances. Nevertheless, “the plaintiff must have known of the means of
mitigation; there must be evidence that the plaintiff had been advised by a doctor that
he or she should submit to a particular treatment,”43 for this doctrine to apply.
Furthermore, so long as a plaintiff picks a reasonable treatment option, if, in
hindsight, another option may have been more successful, the plaintiff’s choice will
not bar his full recovery.44
B. Mitigation of Damages, Beliefs, and Religion
The doctrine of mitigation of damages generally does not require injured parties
to “make efforts that conflict with certain personal choices.”45 For example, in cases
of wrongful life or wrongful birth, courts have ruled, as a matter of law, that
mitigation of damages is not necessary to the extent it necessitates either adoption or
abortion.46
In Troppi v. Scarf,47 the plaintiff’s pharmacist negligently filled her birth control
prescription with tranquilizers.48 The plaintiff subsequently became pregnant and
gave birth to a healthy child.49 She filed suit against the pharmacist, seeking

40

See, e.g., Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991).

41

See, e.g., Thomas v. Plovidba, 653 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Wis. 1987) (finding that plaintiff
did not mitigate damages by missing job interviews, demonstrating bad hygiene at interviews,
and showing up to interviews poorly dressed).
42
3 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS (MB) § 16.02 (2005) (“[T]he injured party may not just
stand idly by and watch his losses grow in anticipation of recovering enhanced damages.”).
43

22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 377 (2004).

44

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. c (1979).

45

Id. at cmt. j.

46

3 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS (MB) § 16.02 (2005); Comras v. Lewin, 443 A.2d 229,
230 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982)
The right to have an abortion may not be automatically converted to an obligation to
have one. The decision whether or not to undertake that medical procedure must rest
on a number of factors, including the stage to which the pregnancy has progressed, the
health and condition of the woman at the time and the professional judgment and
counsel received.
Id. Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 751-52 (Tenn. 1987) (rejecting abortion or adoption as
part of duty to mitigate the court stated: “We think that not only would imposing these choices
upon a plaintiff impermissibly infringe upon Constitutional rights to privacy in these matters,
but the nature of these alternatives is so extreme as to be unreasonable. . . .”); see also Troppi
v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d
169 (Minn. 1977); Morris v. Sanchez, 746 P.2d 184, 189 (Okla. 1987).
47

Troppi, 187 N.W.2d at 511.

48

Id. at 512.

49

Id. at 513.
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damages for the costs associated with the child and for pain and anxiety.50 In his
defense, the pharmacist asserted that the plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages by
not having an abortion when she discovered she was pregnant or, alternatively, by
giving the child up for adoption after its birth.51
The court found that the defendant had to take his victim as he found her,
including her personal beliefs.52 It observed, “[a] living child almost universally
gives rise to emotional and spiritual bonds which few parents can bring themselves
to break.”53 Then, the court went on to quote from McCormick on Damages,
explaining how it interpreted reasonableness:
If the effort, risk, sacrifice, or expense which the person wronged must
incur in order to avoid or minimize a loss of injury is such that under the
circumstances a reasonable man might well decline to incur it, a failure to
do so imposes no disability against recovering full damages.54
Ultimately, the Troppi Court found that the burden such a hard decision would
have on the plaintiff’s conscience tipped the reasonableness scale in favor of the
plaintiff’s decision because it would be worse for the plaintiff to give the child away
than for her to keep him.55 It stated:
[E]ven though the parents may not want to rear the child they may
conclude that the psychological impact on them of rejecting the child and
placing him for adoption, never seeing him again, would be such that,
making the best of a bad situation, it is better to rear the child than to
place him for adoption.56
In addition, the court ruled that “the defendant does not have the right to insist
that the victim of his negligence have the emotional and mental makeup of a woman
who is willing to abort or place a child for adoption.”57 In essence, the court found
that the pharmacist had to take his victim as he found her. Accordingly, the plaintiff
could recover the full amount of damages for the costs of having the child, including
lost wages, medical and hospital expenses, and for her pain and anxiety, and possibly
even the costs of rearing the child to majority.58
Nevertheless, even though abortion constitutes “medical treatment,” and courts
consider the psychological impact an abortion would have on the parent, when
50

Id.

51

See id. at 519.

52

Id. at 520.

53

Troppi, 187 N.W.2d at 519.

54

Id. (citing CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 35 (2d ed. 1952)).

55

Id.

56

Id. at 520.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 520-21 (Michigan law did not preclude damages for raising the child to majority
because “there need only be a basis for reasonable ascertainment of the amount of the
damages.”).
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confronted with a case where other medical treatment can have a similar
psychological impact, a court will still reduce damages when it finds the plaintiff
was “unreasonable” in failing to seek or consent to treatment.59 Courts routinely
reduce damages even though medical decisions based on religious beliefs can have
this kind of psychological impact on the plaintiff.60
1. Two Significant Cases
Munn v. Algee61 exemplifies the current law regarding religion and mitigation of
damages. In Munn, the defendant’s negligent driving caused an automobile accident
that seriously injured the plaintiff.62 The physicians treating the plaintiff sought her
consent to perform a blood transfusion.63 Because the plaintiff was a Jehovah’s
Witness, she would not consent to the treatment because she believed doing so
would be committing a grievous sin.64 Later, after the plaintiff lost consciousness,
her husband, who was also a Jehovah’s Witness, would not consent to a blood
transfusion on his wife’s behalf.65 The plaintiff subsequently died during surgery
59
In his book, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law, Guido Calabresi suggests an
interesting scenario that, much like abortion, courts may also recognize as an exception to
mitigate. GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW 49-50 (Syracuse
University Press 1985). In his example, Calabresi wonders what might happen if a deeply
religious Catholic woman were to be injured in such a way that made pregnancy very
dangerous to her health. Id. If the woman took the teachings of the Catholic church literally
she would be forbidden to use any method of birth control with her husband other than the
rhythm method (or abstinence). Id. If she subsequently became pregnant and was injured as a
result, Calabresi postulates that she would be able to recover because of how the Learned
Hand test for reasonableness is stated:
One must weigh the benefits and harms that would occur from doing one thing against
the benefits and harms that would occur from doing the other, each discounted by the
likelihood of the harms and benefits occurring. If on striking that balance a given
behavior is reasonable, it is not rendered unreasonable merely because an unwanted
result chanced to come about.
Id. Accordingly, a court would also find it not reasonable to expect her to have an abortion for
the same reasons stated in Troppi. See supra Part II.B.
60

See, e.g., Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991); Corlett v. Caserta, 562 N.E.2d
257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). Assuming, of course, that the jurisdiction does not have a specific
statute allowing for compensatory protection for damages resulting from injury that let the
plaintiff make a religious choice not to be conventionally treated. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §
102.42 (2005) (providing for worker’s compensation coverage of Christian Science treatment
if the employee wishes to receive that type of treatment but giving employers the option not to
cover these services). These statutes are rare, but given the current state of the law, they are
the only way legislatures can ensure religious exercise protection for their constituents in the
realm of private tort damage awards.
61

Munn, 924 F.2d at 568.

62

Id. at 570-71.

63

Id. at 571.

64

See id. See also Munn v. Algee, 719 F. Supp. 525, 526 (N.D. Miss. 1989), aff’d, 924
F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991).
65

Munn, 924 F.2d at 571.
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from blood loss.66 Mrs. Munn’s surviving spouse and her children brought a
wrongful death claim against the negligent driver on her behalf, and Mr. Munn
sought damages for his injuries as well.67 “The court granted a directed verdict in
favor of plaintiffs on the question of liability.”68
The main issue in Munn was whether it was admissible to have allowed Munn to
be questioned, on cross examination, about practices and beliefs of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses that did not pertain to the reasonableness of Mrs. Munn’s refusal of a
blood transfusion or to the sincerity of her beliefs.69 On appeal, the court found that
the trial court abused its discretion by allowing in such testimony, including whether
Jehovah’s Witnesses salute the United States flag.70 Nevertheless, the majority
found that such evidence was merely harmless error and did not adversely influence
the jury.71 Judge Rubin wrote a grilling dissent in the case, adamantly disagreeing
with this outcome.72
The court went on to examine whether the trial court allowed the jury to assess
the reasonableness of Munn’s beliefs.73 The jury instruction used to decide the case
“attempt[ed] to accommodate Mrs. Munn’s religious beliefs.”74 In affirming the
denial of a damage award for the wrongful death claim, the court ruled that when the
trial court decided the plaintiff did not mitigate her damages as required by law, it
was only evaluating the reasonableness of her refusal of a blood transfusion, not the
reasonableness of her beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness.75
The dissent in Munn took issue against the validity of this jury instruction.76
Judge Rubin pointed out that the award the jury returned for pain and suffering was
undoubtedly influenced by the jury’s negative perception of Jehovah’s Witnesses, as
it was significantly less than a typical award for injuries as extensive as Mrs. Munn
66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 572.

70

Id. at 572, 581.

71

Munn, 924 F.2d at 573.

72

See id. at 579-80 (dissenting opinion).

73

Id. at 574 (majority opinion).

74

Id. The actual jury instruction stated:
In determining whether or not Elaine Munn’s decision to refuse the blood transfusion
was unreasonable, you may consider that the blood transfusions were medically
recommended. But, you may also consider her religious beliefs and related teachings,
together with the known risks of blood transfusions, if you find that to be a factor in
her decision.
Id. at 578.
75
76

See id. at 578.

In closing, Judge Rubin stated, “Algee’s lawyer deliberately threw the proverbial skunk
of inadmissible evidence into the jury box. No amount of conjecture that the jury might not
have smelled the stink can undo the odor that, even now, permeates the record.” Id. at 585
(emphasis in original).
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suffered.77 Additionally, in addressing the utter lack of any award to Mr. Munn,
Judge Rubin stated:
I can conceive of no reason but general dislike of the plaintiff for a jury to
award medical expenses against an admittedly liable defendant, but to
award nothing for pain and suffering when the uncontroverted evidence
was that Munn suffered pain and general discomfort from his ‘bruises and
contusions’ for several months.78
The second issue in Munn was whether the trial court violated Munn’s First
Amendment rights when it determined that she failed to mitigate damages because of
her religious beliefs against blood transfusions.79 Addressing the Free Exercise
concern raised, the court relied on Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith.80 In that case, the United States Supreme Court examined a law
that burdened Smith’s ability to practice his religion.81 Because the burdensome law
was neutral on its face, not specifically discriminating against any particular religion,
the Court held that it was constitutional.82
The Munn Court decided that the facts at hand were similar enough to warrant
the same outcome as in Smith. It found that the mitigation of damages doctrine
could be compared to “generally applicable rules imposing incidental burdens on
particular religions,” so it did “not violate the Free Exercise Clause” to hold the
plaintiff to a reasonable person standard for mitigating damages.83 But by dismissing
this claim so easily, the court missed the point of Smith—in cases of individualized
assessment, a plaintiff is entitled to greater protection.84 Specifically, in cases of
individualized assessment, the government must justify rules that burden the exercise
of religion with a compelling government purpose.85 What greater instance could
there be for individualized assessment than by a jury of one’s peers, given an
instruction such as the Munn jury used?
The Munn court also found that this case did not violate the Establishment
Clause. It recognized that the reasonableness of a plaintiff’s religious beliefs could
be subject to scrutiny by a jury, and such an examination of the plaintiff’s religion
could involve weighing the reasonableness of religious beliefs in violation of the
Establishment Clause.86 In a circular explanation for its finding, the court reasoned
that the Establishment Clause was not violated in this case because Munn interjected

77

Munn, 924 F.2d at 583, 585.

78

Id. at 585.

79

Id. at 574-75.

80

Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

81

Id. at 874.

82

Id. at 885-86.

83

Munn, 924 F.2d at 574.

84

See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.

85

See infra Part III.B.

86

Munn, 924 F.2d at 574-75.
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religion into the case himself in an attempt to explain his wife’s conduct that a jury
would probably find unreasonable without the religious explanation.87 In a footnote,
the court directed that future cases should be decided using an objective person
standard and, as such, should disallow accommodating a plaintiff’s religious
beliefs.88
Williams v. Bright89 is another case with an outcome similar to Munn. This case
also involved a Jehovah’s Witness plaintiff who was in a car accident that caused her
serious injuries.90 Surgery was an option for the plaintiff in this case, and her
physicians believed it would prevent her from being wheelchair-bound for the rest of
her life.91 Unfortunately, the plaintiff “was obliged to refuse these recommended
surgeries because her church prohibit[ed] the blood transfusions they would
necessarily entail.”92
Attempting to protect the plaintiff’s right to freely exercise her religion, the trial
court gave the jury an instruction that required it to consider what a reasonable
Jehovah’s Witness would have done in the same situation.93 Nevertheless, on appeal,
the court found this instruction to be in error. Specifically, it found that the court’s
instruction was a “sham inquiry,” and the court “foreclosed the issue [of her religious
beliefs] in her favor without any supporting evidence.”94 This decision, the court
reasoned, “effectively provided government endorsement to those beliefs.”95
Then, the court went on to explain that even if the trial court had required
evidence of the plaintiff’s beliefs, it would necessarily find itself in a quandary as to
how to do so.96 Even so, what the court ignored is that courts have been able to put
themselves in a situation to discern such a fact in many instances. For example,
courts have successfully addressed this same issue in cases arguing over
conscientious objector exemption to combative service,97 as well as in cases of
individualized assessment.98
Similar to Munn, Williams contains a censorious dissent, authored by Judge
Rosenberger, who believed the jury instruction was proper.99 He asserted that this
instruction was in line with the rule of mitigation of damages, which does not require

87

Id. at 575.

88

Id. at 575 n.12.

89

Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).

90

Id. at 911.

91

Id. at 912.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id. at 914.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

See infra Part IV.B.

98

See infra Part II.B.2.

99

See Williams, 658 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
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one to minimize one’s losses at the expense of personal beliefs.100 Furthermore,
Judge Rosenberger emphasized that the jury charge was “in conformity with our tort
system” and “allow[ed] for an assessment of the actual situation of [the] victim . . .
.”101 Pointing out that the “‘eggshell plaintiff’ has not been limited to physical
infirmities,” Judge Rosenberger stressed that this instruction followed the basic
premise that a defendant must take his victim as he finds him.102
2. Individualized Assessments for Benefits
There are several cases concerning state benefits that directly address Free
Exercise concerns, but unlike tort cases, courts in these instances carefully follow a
First Amendment analysis that recognizes the danger of crossing into the forbidden
territory of judging religious beliefs.
For example, in Montgomery v. Board of Retirement,103 the plaintiff would not
undergo surgery to remove a tumor.104 If she underwent the surgery, it was very
likely that she would fully recover and be able to return to work; however, without
the surgery, it was likely that she would remain disabled and perhaps even die from
the tumor.105
The court found that the county violated the Free Exercise Clause when it denied
Montgomery disability retirement benefits for her decision not to undergo surgery
because of her beliefs as a member of the Church of God.106 The court ruled that the
denial of retirement benefits indirectly burdened the employee’s free exercise of
religion by forcing her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
the disability benefits.107
In deciding this case, the court relied on the United States Supreme Court
decision in Sherbert v. Verner.108 Sherbert presented a similar situation, where the
plaintiff was a Seventh-Day Adventist who would not work on Saturday, the
Sabbath-Day for her religion.109 She sought new employment after her employer
discharged her for refusing to work mandatory Saturday shifts, but she could not find
a position that would allow her to observe her Sabbath-Day.110 When she applied for
unemployment benefits, the state denied her claim because of her refusal to work on

100

Id. at 918 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. j (1979)).

101

Id. at 919.

102

Id.
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Montgomery v. Bd. of Ret., 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Cal Ct. App. 1973).

104

Id. at 183.
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Id.
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Id. at 183-84 (finding that position as “member, officer, worker, and teacher” in the
church precluded plaintiff from committing the sin of undergoing internal surgery).
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Id. at 184.
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Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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Id. at 399.
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Id.
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Saturdays.111 The Court applied a two-part test: (1) whether the application of the
unemployment statute imposed any burden upon the free exercise of the claimant’s
religion; and (2) if so, whether there was a compelling state interest that justified the
infringement upon Free Exercise rights.112
In Sherbert, the Court ruled that the state’s unemployment scheme was
unconstitutional, as it forced her to “choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts
of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”113 The Court noted
“condition[ing] the availability of benefits upon this appellant’s willingness to
violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free
exercise of her constitutional liberties.”114 Therefore, just as in Sherbert, the
government burdened the plaintiff in Montgomery in her practice of religion because
it forced her to choose between receiving benefits and violating a tenet of her
religious faith.
Furthermore, in Montgomery, the court addressed the second part of the Sherbert
test: “[W]hether some compelling state interest justifies the substantial infringement
of appellant’s First Amendment right.”115 Sherbert reasoned that when such an
important right is at stake, the state would have to show more than a rational basis
for its infringement.116 Specifically, in Sherbert, the state did not meet its burden of
proof; the possibility that fraudulent claimants could take advantage of the system
and cripple it by diluting available funds and interfering with employer scheduling
was not sufficient.117 Therefore, in Montgomery, although the state reasoned that the
government had an interest in “preserving the life and health of its citizens,” this
interest was not great enough to merit infringing on First Amendment rights.118
There was no evidence in Montgomery that making exceptions to accommodate First
Amendment rights would disrupt or dilute the retirement plan enough to justify the
state in its denial.119 Additionally, the court determined that there was no alternative
that would infringe less upon her Free Exercise rights.120
More recently, the United States Supreme Court has reinforced the importance of
protecting religious rights when cases of individualized assessment are at issue. In

111

Id. at. 399-400.

112

Id. at 403.

113

Id. at 404.

114

Id. at 406.
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Montgomery v. Bd. of Ret., 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
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Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
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Id. at 407.
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Montgomery, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 185 (stating that “[w]hen considerations of conscience
grounded upon religious beliefs are involved, the state interest in preserving health pales into
insignificance”).
119

Id. “Furthermore, in a constitutional context involving basic rights, the preservation of
moneys is not of primary significance.” Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
120

Id.
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Smith,121 the Supreme Court addressed this topic directly. In this case, Smith was
fired from his job for sacramental use of peyote, which was an illegal drug in
Oregon.122 When he applied for unemployment benefits, the Employment Appeals
Board denied his request because his employer discharged him for work-related
“misconduct.”123 The Court found that it was permissible for a state to pass a law
that “incidentally forbids . . . the performance of an act that [a] religious belief
requires . . . if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is
otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for
nonreligious reasons.”124 In reaching its conclusion, the Court determined that the
Sherbert test was reserved for an instance that specifically “lent itself to
individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct.”125
In Smith, the Sherbert test was inapplicable because a law of valid and neutral
general applicability was applied as a total prohibition against particular conduct,
and any burden placed upon a particular religion was merely incidental.126
C. Lack of a Realistic Solution
As these cases illustrate, courts do not apply the law fairly across the board when
the same facts are at hand. Courts dealing with tort damages hold that it is
impermissible for a jury to consider if a person acted reasonably given his religious
beliefs,127 although courts dealing with government benefits require beliefs to be an
inviolable right of the plaintiff that are not to be subjected to an objective test of
reasonableness.128 Furthermore, courts do not recognize that judgment by a jury of a
plaintiff’s actions in tort cases is an instance of individualized assessment, thereby
invoking the protections of Sherbert. The result is a constitutional mess that must
leave plaintiffs wondering what “Free Exercise rights” really means.
It is obvious that if one has to choose between recovering damages and asserting
the right to follow one’s faith, cases like Munn and Williams discourage the free
exercise of religion. In Williams, the court believed it would be endorsing the beliefs
of the plaintiff if it accepted as fact that the plaintiff held the beliefs she professed.129
Notwithstanding, the Williams court, as well as the Munn court,130 ignored the
subsequent consequence of holding a plaintiff to a reasonable person standard. The
standard that courts hold the objective, reasonable person to is the standard of the
majority. Accordingly, the system of beliefs (religious or otherwise) that the juror
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must follow when making this “reasonableness” decision are the beliefs of the
majority. Therefore, the court allows the majority’s system of beliefs to be
controlling because the standard that it judges “reasonableness” by is that of the
majority. Accordingly, it violates the Establishment Clause by allowing for judicial
acknowledgement of a certain set of beliefs as “the right ones.” Accordingly, if the
court were endorsing anyone’s religious beliefs it would be endorsing the beliefs of
the majority, and this endorsement cuts to the very purpose for the Establishment
Clause.
A look at one of the United States Supreme Court’s on-point decisions sheds
some light on the subject. Walz v. Tax Commission of New York131 addressed a
problem significantly similar to the issue stated above. In Walz, the Court upheld a
New York statute from constitutional attack that granted property tax exemptions to
religious organizations so long as they only used the property for “religious
worship.”132 The Court held that this statute did not violate the Establishment Clause
because it granted tax exemption to all religious groups, not just to select churches or
groups.133 To the contrary, the Court found that allowing religious groups “freedom
from taxation . . . operated affirmatively to help guarantee the free exercise of all
forms of religious beliefs.”134 Allowing judicial acknowledgement of all religious
beliefs in tort cases would be neutral as well, staying safely within constitutional
limits.
The Williams Court did have a valid point when it raised the issue of what would
happen had conflicting expert testimony on the plaintiff’s religious beliefs been
presented.135 It is clear that the law does not allow this inquiry: the Supreme Court
specifically addressed this issue long ago. In United States v. Ballard,136 the
defendant was indicted on mail fraud charges for organizing a group that distributed
and sold literature through the mail putting forth the defendant’s religious doctrines
and for soliciting funds and memberships from those who responded.137 The
Supreme Court adamantly opposed submitting to the jury the question of whether
there was truth in the defendant’s beliefs.138 The Court identified the primary error
involved with such a jury instruction. It stated:
The religious views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not
preposterous, to most people. But if those doctrines are subject to trial
before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity, then the same can
be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact
undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain. The First Amendment
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Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 666 (1970).
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Id.
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Id. at 672-73.
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Id. at 678.

135

Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
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does not select any one group or any one type of religion for preferred
treatment. It puts them all in that position.139
Ballard set the foundation for cases in the future regarding religious beliefs. No
court may charge a jury to judge whether one’s beliefs are true or false.140 To do so
directly contradicts the Free Exercise Clause. Essentially, allowing a jury to judge
one’s actions stemming from the right to freely exercise one’s religion does just
that—it forces the jury to judge whether the beliefs of a plaintiff are reasonable. A
court cannot separate the plaintiff’s actions and his beliefs in this instance because
the actions represent the beliefs themselves. Instead, the issue for the jury is whether
the defendant himself held these beliefs.141
The Williams court did not complete its thought on the conflicting expert
testimony in its rush to argue that when the trial court simply accepted the plaintiff’s
beliefs as a fact it endorsed her beliefs in violation of the Establishment Clause.142
The court did not stop and note that cases of individualized assessment and
conscientious objection force such a delicate question upon courts that have found a
test that satisfies such a difficult inquiry. The root of this test is that the beliefs of the
individual must be considered part and parcel of his persona, with no limit upon
which system of beliefs are offered this treatment.143 To take any other approach
impermissibly steps upon the toes of his freedom to exercise. Essentially, courts
treat the individual as it finds him.
Arguing over what is the proper reasonable person standard for each case or
whether reasonable believers of whatever religion are acting reasonably does not
offer plaintiffs adequate protection of their constitutional rights. There will never be
a reasonable solution if courts are limited to these two choices. The objective
(majority belief) reasonable person standard clearly violates the Establishment
Clause, as explained above. Meanwhile, a reasonable belief standard allows the
impermissible inquiry into beliefs that Williams complains of.144 The only remedy is
to take the approach that a defendant must simply take his victim as he finds him—
with religious beliefs as part and parcel of the individual.
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Id. at 87.
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See id.
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III. HOW RELIGIOUS BELIEFS FIT AS A PRE-EXISTING STATE OF THE PLAINTIFF
There are several different types of pre-existing conditions that courts recognize,
all of which require the defendant to take his victim as he finds him. Courts allow
recovery for injuries compounded by such pre-existing conditions, regardless of
whether they are foreseeable to the defendant.145 Most often, physical conditions are
the subject of litigation; however, courts have applied the doctrine of pre-existing
conditions in instances outside of the strictly physical sense as well.146 Furthermore,
science has found physical traces in the body that at least show a predisposition to
religious beliefs.147 Consequently, it is reasonable to treat religious beliefs as a preexisting condition of a plaintiff.
A. What is a Pre-Existing Condition?
The law concerning aggravation of pre-existing conditions is very clear, and
courts throughout the United States universally apply it.148 Generally, a defendant
must take his plaintiff as he finds him, and the defendant is liable to the plaintiff for
injuries that occur because of any special sensitivity the plaintiff has, such as a “preexisting disease, condition, or predisposition to injury.”149 Such a person is often
referred to as an “eggshell skull”150 or “thin-skull” plaintiff.151 When a defendant
encounters such a plaintiff, it is irrelevant whether the plaintiff’s pre-existing
condition makes his damages “more extensive than could have been foreseen or
reasonably expected.”152 For example, if a plaintiff has an abnormally thin skull and
suffers death from an injury that would normally cause only a bump on a normal
person, the rule is that the defendant is liable for all of his victim’s injuries.153 As is
any plaintiff, the plaintiff with the thin skull is still responsible for mitigating his
damages, if possible, even though the injury he suffers is greater than what the
defendant could expect from a plaintiff without such a pre-existing condition.154 But
a court will not deny him recovery for any extensive injuries that occur because of
his pre-existing condition.155
145

See infra Part III.A.
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See infra Part III.A.2.
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See infra Part III.B.
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2 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 15.03(1)(a) (2005) (citing to a decision applying this
doctrine in every state).
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W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (West 5th
ed. 1984).
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2 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 15.03(1)(a) (2005).
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Id. at (1)(b); see also Figueroa-Torres v. Toledo-Davila, 232 F.3d 270, 275 (1st Cir.
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a pre-existing condition).
153

KEETON ET AL., supra note 150, at 292.

154

3 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 16.01 (2005).

155

2 DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 15.03(1)(b) (2005).
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1. Mental Conditions
Courts treat many mental maladies as pre-existing conditions when plaintiffs
claim the defendant’s tortious conduct resulted in injury.156 Schizophrenic
episodes,157 post-traumatic stress disorder,158 and depression159 are common preexisting mental conditions that require application of the thin-skull plaintiff doctrine.
For example, in Barlow v. Plummer,160 the plaintiff was involved in a car
accident that caused her whiplash161 and triggered a relapse of her reoccurring mental
illness.162 The defendant’s negligence did not cause her depressive disorder, but it
aggravated her condition so that where she had been stable before the accident, she
now suffered a relapse of her depression. 163 Accordingly, she was entitled to
damages for the aggravation of her pre-existing condition.164
Botek v. Mine Safety Appliance Corp.165 presents another case where the court
considered emotional damage caused by the defendant’s negligence. Botek
participated in a firefighter training exercise, which required the use of an oxygen
mask.166 Unfortunately, the manufacturer of his air pack had mistakenly filled it with
carbon monoxide instead of oxygen.167 Botek passed out and awoke to find
emergency personnel treating him with oxygen.168 He suffered headaches,
disorientation, and nausea immediately after the incident; however, as time went by,
his mental condition deteriorated severely.169
The examining psychologist at trial concluded that Botek suffered from PostTraumatic Stress Syndrome caused by the accident, and this disorder kept him from
seeking treatment for the problem for several years.170 The court stated, “[i]t is
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158

See, e.g., Botek v. Mine Safety Appliance Corp., 611 A.2d 1174 (Pa. 1992).

159

See, e.g., Barlow v. Plummer, 195 So. 2d 321 (La. Ct. App. 1967).

160

Id.

161

Id. at 322.

162

Id. at 324 (explaining that Barlow was diagnosed as a pseudoneurotic schizophrenic).

163

See id. at 325-26.

164

Id. at 325. On appeal, the court reduced the amount of damages awarded by $3,000. It
found that plaintiff’s “emotional [and] mental disturbance[s] so triggered [were] not of such a
nature that it disabled [plaintiff] or caused her any great suffering” because it only took her
“seven or eight visits to her treating psychiatrist over a period of five or six months” to
“completely restore her to her former condition.”
165

Botek v. Mine Safety Appliance Corp., 611 A.2d 1174 (Pa. 1992).

166

Id. at 1174.

167

Id.

168

Id. at 1175.

169

Id.

170

Id.

126

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 20:107

simple black letter law that a tortfeasor must take its victim as it finds him.”171
Furthermore, the court asserted, “[i]t is clear that where a claimant’s rejection of
treatment is part of his emotional injuries, he may recover damages in spite of the
failure to receive treatment.”172 Therefore, although it is likely that not all plaintiffs
who are injured will suffer such emotional disturbances as Botek did, he had some
type of predisposition that caused him to react this way. The court recognized this
predisposition and it is for that reason that the principle that a tortfeasor must take his
victim as he finds him was applicable in this case.
Similarly, the court considered the mental condition of the plaintiff in Troppi, as
explained earlier.173 The court considered the plaintiff’s mental makeup an
inseparable part of her so the defendant had to take her as he found her: unwilling to
give up her child.174
Proving emotional disturbances presents a challenge to parties in court; however,
just as with proving one adheres to certain religious beliefs, courts deal with the issue
with regularity.175 In each case involving mental disturbance, so long as the trier of
fact concludes that the parties present sufficient evidence, it considers these
emotional or mental characteristics part of the plaintiff and the defendant must take
him as he finds him.176 As one court pointed out when dealing with such a situation,
“‘guarantee of genuiness’ [sic] might ultimately be found ‘in the circumstances of
the case.’”177
2. Physical Conditions
The most easily recognized pre-existing conditions involve pre-existing physical
maladies.178 Back conditions,179 Parkinson’s disease,180 diabetes,181 epilepsy,182 and
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ailments” were aggravated by the injury); Tobin v. Steisel, 475 N.E.2d 101, 102 (N.Y. 1985)
(regarding “traumatic neurosis with depression”); Boodram v. Brooklyn Developmental Ctr.,
773 N.Y.S.2d 817 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2003) (stating that negligence of her employer by failing to
prevent sexual harassment in the work place caused post-traumatic stress disorder to develop
in Plaintiff); see also Barlow v. Plummer, 195 So. 2d 321 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Botek v. Mine
Safety Appliance Corp., 611 A.2d 1174 (Pa. 1992).
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See Boodram, 773 N.Y.S.2d at 825, 826 (explaining the characteristics that courts
consider include the severity of the condition, its duration, whether there are physical
manifestations of the condition, the medical treatment a plaintiff may receive in response to
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brittle bones183 are only a few examples of pre-existing physical conditions that
courts have found to be aggravated by a defendant’s tortious conduct. Although
most of these physical conditions are beyond the control of the plaintiff, obesity
presents itself as a notable exception.
Obesity can be a controversial pre-existing physical condition because a plaintiff
can exercise a significant degree of control over his own bodyweight. Like plaintiffs
who make religious medical choices that affect the success of their medical recovery,
defendants have tried to argue that voluntary actions of the plaintiff led to their
obesity. Accordingly, they argue the defendant should not be liable for damages
caused when the weight of the plaintiff resulted in greater injury than would have
occurred in a person who was not overweight.
For example, in Close v. New York,184 the overweight plaintiff had been advised
by her doctors to lose weight in order to relieve pain she experienced as a result of an
injury sustained in an accident.185 The court decided it should not reduce her damage
award even though she failed to lose weight because she was overweight before her
accident and had not been able to stay on a healthy diet.186 Therefore, although the
plaintiff may have been able to mitigate her damages by losing weight, the court did
not require her to do so to receive her full damage award. Instead, it considered her
weight to be a pre-existing condition.
Conversely, in Moctezuma v. Industrial Commission of Arizona,187 the court ruled
that the claimant was not entitled to worker’s compensation benefits when her doctor
prescribed a weight reduction program that she did not follow.188 The plaintiff had
been heavy before her accident, but she gained a significant amount of weight after
her accident. In this situation, the court considered weight to be within the
claimant’s control, as she exhibited the ability to lose weight when she did stick to
her diet.189 Because the court observed that her weight gain could aggravate the
severity of her injury, it found that her weight was not a pre-existing condition and
denied her receipt of benefits.190
Finally, Lewis v. Insurance Company of North America191 exemplifies both
obesity and another pre-existing condition within the same plaintiff. In this case,
Lewis was injured while working at her job as a cook when she slipped on a piece of
lettuce.192 Lewis was tremendously overweight when the accident happened, and the
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defense argued that she continued to gain weight afterwards.193 Physicians who
examined her injuries “noted that she had a degenerative osteoarthritic condition
which was most likely dormant before the accident.”194
While Lewis argued that her injury triggered her previously dormant arthritic
condition to the extent that she was unable to perform her former duties without
“substantial pain,” the defendants argued that her increase in weight should bar her
from recovery under the mitigation of damages doctrine.195 The court found that
although Lewis's doctor advised her to lose weight, he had never actually prescribed
her a weight-loss plan.196 In addition, the court was not convinced that weight loss of
100 pounds, which doctors estimated to be the amount Lewis would have to lose to
return to her prior health, would be reasonable treatment.197 The court concluded that
she had “suffered total and permanent disability” and would not be able to return to
her position as a cook.198 Accordingly, although it did not say so explicitly, the court
considered both Lewis’s weight and her dormant arthritic condition as pre-existing
condition because the defendant had to take Lewis as it found her. As a result, she
was not required to mitigate her injury by changing her weight.
These cases did not involve plaintiffs who could not lose weight because of a
medical condition; instead, they involved plaintiffs who would not lose weight by
their own inclination. Although the plaintiffs in Close and Lewis made the voluntary
choice not to lose weight, the courts in those cases still required the defendant to take
the plaintiff as it found them. Moctezuma can be distinguished from these two cases
because the plaintiff’s significant weight gain after her injury was not a pre-existing
condition.
3. Combination and Other Conditions
Although courts have normally limited the thin-skull doctrine to cases involving
mental or physical pre-existing conditions, there are other instances when a
defendant must take his victim as he finds him. This concept was put most
poignantly by the trial court when deciding Williams:199 “The disability of a chief
executive of a major corporation will call for more damages than that of a minimumwage hamburger flipper.”200
Schafer v. Hoffman201 exemplifies the concept of financial value as an inseparable
part of the plaintiff. In this case, Hoffman struck the plaintiff, a pedestrian, with her
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See id. at 430-31. At the time of the trial, plaintiff weighed approximately 250 pounds.
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See id. at 431.
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See Williams v. Bright, 632 N.Y.S.2d 760, 764-67 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995).
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car while driving under the influence of drugs and alcohol.202 Schafer was seriously
injured, and in her suit for damages, the Colorado Supreme Court had to address
whether the trial court correctly gave a thin-skull instruction to the jury.203
The jury instruction in this case actually reflected two pre-existing condition
scenarios in the facts. First, the court ruled that Schafer presented testimony at her
trial that supported the jury finding that pre-existing physical maladies she suffered
from were aggravated by the accident.204 Second, the court examined Schafer’s
employment situation and found the trial court’s thin-skull jury instruction again
acceptable because it encompassed the disadvantage the plaintiff now had in her
particular job market given her injuries.205 The court reasoned that a defendant must
take his victim as he finds him, including the chance that his victim, now
disadvantaged in her specific job market because of her injuries, costs more than an
unskilled person would to be made whole.206
Alcoholism poses another challenging examination for courts when a plaintiff
asserts thin-skull protections for damage awards. In Pierce v. General Motors Co.,207
the Michigan Supreme Court struggled with the issue of alcoholism as a pre-existing
condition. Pierce argued that harassment at work caused him to drink more than he
did before his employment, and that stress caused him to develop a debilitating
nervous disorder.208
The court ultimately decided against the majority of
jurisdictions209 by ruling that it should not consider alcoholism a pre-existing
condition.210 In its analysis, the court reasoned that the plaintiff’s alcoholism was
202

Id.
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Id. at 899.

204

Id. at 901.
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Id. at 902; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 150, at 292 (stating that “the defendant
who kills another must take the chances, as to damages for the death, that the other has a large
income, although the defendant had no reason to expect it”).
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See Proyer v. Monsanto Co., 606 So. 2d 1307 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that although
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what triggered the nervous disorder,211 and work stress could not be found to be the
reason that his alcoholism worsened because “it is not a job or occupation that
compels alcoholics to consume alcohol; it is the disease from which they suffer.”212
Vehemently dissenting, Judge Cavanagh pointed out that while the majority
opinion placed fault for the disease on the plaintiff, the worker’s compensation
statute under which he brought his case allowed recovery even if the plaintiff was at
fault or the work stress was not the only cause.213 He was incredulous that the
majority could ignore the legitimate controversy over “whether alcoholism may be
caused by hereditary or environmental factors,” and professed that the court should
refrain from taking sides before there is “overwhelming scientific evidence tending
to support one view in preference to another.”214 Furthermore, Judge Cavanagh
explained how the majority opinion ignored the established rule of pre-existing
conditions: because alcoholism is a disease and if the defendant's negligent conduct
aggravates the disease, the defendant is liable if the plaintiff’s condition worsens.215
Because the Worker’s Compensation Review Board made such a finding, he
concluded that the defendant was clearly not responsible for the entire disease, but
that it was responsible to the extent that work stress aggravated the disease to the
point of disability.216
As these cases exemplify, pre-existing conditions can take on a variety of forms.
They may manifest themselves through the mind of the plaintiff or through some
outward physical sign, or both. In addition, although some conditions may be
somewhat under the plaintiff’s control, courts will take into consideration the
surrounding circumstances when deciding whether they exist as a pre-existing
condition that requires the defendant to take his victim as he finds him.
B. Religion as a Pre-Existing Condition: The Body and Belief
The main purpose of tort damages is to make the plaintiff whole, and the doctrine
of pre-existing conditions is necessary if the law is to achieve this goal.
Accordingly, courts recognize all of the discussed conditions as part of the plaintiff
and require the defendant to take his victim as he finds him. If courts are willing to
recognize such conditions as depression, alcoholism, obesity, and profitability as part
of the plaintiff, all of which are arguably somewhat voluntary, it seems odd that the
law would not include specific religious beliefs as part of the plaintiff as well.
While much is still unknown about the brain and how it processes information,
scientists have made remarkable discoveries in recent years when studying brain
activity. Research reveals that the center for religious thoughts can be pinpointed in

211
Id. at 652. The court stated, “[i]t is not work and its attendant stresses that aggravate
alcoholism; it is alcohol,” and went on to cite a quote in a footnote: “Alcoholics can always
give a reason why they drink.” Id. (citing JAMES E. ROYCE, ALCOHOL PROBLEMS AND
ALCOHOLISM: A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY 98 (Free Press 1989) (1981).
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the brain, and the study of this subject has only scratched the tip of the iceberg of the
phenomenal machine that is the human brain.
At Columbia University’s Center for the Study of Science and Religion, Dr.
Michael Baime, who practices Tibetan Buddhist meditation, worked with Andrew
Newberg in conducting one of the most interesting studies in this field of
“neurotheology.”217 Using a SPECT machine218 while Dr. Baime was in a deep
meditative state, Newberg examined Dr. Baime’s brain activity.219 When Dr. Baime
felt he was at “the peak of spiritual intensity,” the SPECT image of his brain was
recorded.220 It revealed a vibrant area of activity in the prefrontal cortex and a lack
of activity in the superior parietal lobe. This lobe is responsible for body orientation,
and without the sensory input necessary for this region to do its job, “the left
orientation area cannot find any boundary between the self and the world.”221
Upon repetition with volunteers from another religion, Newberg achieved the
same results. Franciscan nuns volunteered for the study, and while in intense prayer,
the SPECT image showed the same result as Dr. Baime’s brain had shown.222 This
“biologically based event[] in the brain223 . . . gives the experience a reality that
psychologists and neuroscientists had long denied it and explains why people
experience ineffable transcendent events as equally real as seeing a wondrous sunset
or stubbing their toes.”224
A researcher at Laurentian University, Michael Persinger, has used
electromagnets on volunteers to trigger activity in certain regions of the brain.225 By
creating a weak magnetic field, the temporal lobe can be induced into creating
sensations in the volunteer that are described as “supernatural or spiritual.”226
Persinger theorizes that such “mini electrical storms in the temporal lobes” can be
“triggered by anxiety, personal crisis, lack of oxygen, low blood sugar, and simple

217

Sharon Begley & Anne Underwood, Religion and the Brain: In the New Field of
“Neurotheology,” Scientists Seek the Biological Basis of Spirituality. Is God All in Our
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fatigue.”227 The obvious connection to human experience is that during such times
many individuals find themselves turning to God.
Another pioneer in this field, Vilayanur Ramachandran also conducted
experiments in this area and concluded that one’s religiosity could depend on the
amount of activity in the temporal lobes, just as the previously described experiments
did.228 He asserts that because the speech processing area of the brain is in this area,
significantly increased electrical activity could cause these areas to activate.229
Because sensory information is suppressed during intense prayer or meditation, as
Newberg’s experiments revealed, Ramachandran believes one could perceive to hear
the “voice of God,” as the brain is “more likely to misattribute internally generated
thoughts to an external source” during this time.230
Even the physical manifestations of decision-making have been subject to study.
By recording drastic changes in core personality components of people who suffered
brain damage, neurologist Dr. Bruce Miller could track the location in the right
frontal lobe of one’s characteristics such as preferences in food and clothing, as well
as an individual’s “most basic views, values, beliefs, and principles.”231
Furthermore, scientists have even been able to locate one’s ability to make decisions
within “the limbic system including parts of the anterior cingulate gyrus.”232 This
phenomenal process occurs by the brain connecting “subjective experience with
specific emotions or goals, enabling one to make choices.”233
Taking this research one step further, Matthew Alper reported his findings on the
subject in his book, The “God” Part of the Brain.234 Given the evidence that there is
a specific region in the brain designed to process spiritual impulses, Alper argues
that humans are predisposed to develop their “own spiritual identity or what we call
a religion.”235 With the brain “hardwired” for such development, scientists began to
inquire into how such development actually occurs.236
Dean Hamer, a geneticist at the National Cancer Institute at the National
Institutes of Health, addressed the intriguing issue of nature versus nurture for the
answer.237 His genetic findings indicate that “spirituality . . . doesn’t result from
227
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outside influences.”238 By studying twins and siblings, Hamer demonstrated that
among families where children were raised in the same family environment, each
individual’s level of “spirituality” varied.239 His studies revealed that although twins
and siblings raised in the same environment are more likely to be just as religious as
the others in their family religiosity and spirituality were not the same.240
Religiousness is a learned behavior, but spirituality “comes from within.”241 Hamer
identified this specific genetic signature that predisposed its owner to have a greater
level of spirituality.242 He concluded that, “the content of religious ideas and
traditions is cultural, whereas the predisposition to believe them may be at least
partially genetic.”243
Hamer took this knowledge even further, trying to determine whether individuals
affiliate with their specific religious group because of their genes or because of their
environment.244 He studied groups of twins living together at home and groups
living on their own.245 As the twins grew up and left home, separated from the
imposition of their parents’ beliefs, Hamer noticed two changes in the twins’
religious beliefs.246 First, their environment obviously became more influential than
when their parental role models closely guided them.247 Second, he observed that it
was statistically significant in women that “genes seemed to play a role in their
beliefs.”248 The specific gene somehow predisposes its holder to “radically throw off
her past and embrace a new tenet of beliefs.”249 Similarly, when Hamer studied
twins in the hopes of finding a genetic link to “adherence to doctrine and acceptance
of traditional beliefs,” the evidence was undeniable that “genetic differences . . .
[and] . . . one’s shared environment . . . both play a significant role.”250
All of these studies and research positively reflect that religious beliefs can at
least have some literal “physical presence” in the body or that they can at least
manifest themselves in the brain as any recoupable mental condition can. If a court
would insist that the thin-skull plaintiff doctrine should only be applicable to pre238
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existing physical conditions, science is clearly on its way to proving that such a link
exists.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR EXTENDING THE THIN-SKULL DOCTRINE
Courts should begin to take a hard look at the public policy behind the mitigation
of damages doctrine. With cases in our nation’s history such as Montgomery, which
asserted, “[w]hen considerations of conscience grounded upon religious beliefs are
involved, the state interest in preserving health pales into insignificance,”251 why
insist on the public policy considerations behind mitigation of damages that prevent
constitutional protections from being extended into the private realm? Religious
freedom and prevention of waste do not mix under the same heading—it is
equivalent to trying to patch a round hole with a square peg.
Religious beliefs should serve as a pre-existing mental state of mind or
“condition” that qualify believers for exemption from certain medical treatment that
would otherwise be considered “reasonable,” just as conscientious objectors to war
are exempt from combative service for their country because of their religious
beliefs. The United States Supreme Court has already had to address the delicate
problem of religious beliefs as part of the plaintiff in these decisions, so it has proven
it is capable of doing so. Furthermore, criminal law doctrine has never permitted a
defendant to escape conviction simply because the victim has certain beliefs.252
Discrimination against plaintiffs in tort actions needs to cease.
A. Pre-Existing Condition Debate
Without much elaboration, in Williams, the Supreme Court of New York tossed
aside the trial court’s eloquent opinion on the applicability of the thin-skull doctrine
as simply, “error.”253 The only thought it gave to this subject was that the doctrine
was “traditionally limited to a plaintiff’s pre-existing physical condition, mental
illness, or psychological disability.”254 Similarly, Munn stated that the doctrine did
not apply because “the principle has been applied only to pre-existing physical
injuries.” 255 The court also opted to “decline the invitation to extends its scope,”
even though there was convincing evidence that the plaintiff’s state courts would.256
251
See supra Part II.B.2. See also Montgomery v. Bd. of Ret., 109 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1973).
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See Beth Linea Carlson, Blood and Judgment: Inconsistencies Between Criminal and
Civil Courts When Victims Refuse Blood Transfusions, 33 STETSON L. REV. 1067 (2004); see
also Klinger v. Florida, 816 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that “[t]he fact
that [plaintiff] refused a blood transfusion which might have saved his life does not absolve
[defendant] from criminal liability”); Ford v. Indiana, 521 N.E.2d 1309, 1310 (Ind. 1988)
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responsibility” when charged with a homicide); North Carolina v. Welch, 521 S.E.2d 266, 268
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that “[t]o escape responsibility based on an intervening
cause, the defendant must show that the intervening act was ‘the sole cause of death’”)
(citation omitted).
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These courts did not fully consider the purpose or the true extent of the preexisting condition doctrine. Instead, the courts waived the plaintiff’s religious
beliefs aside as a voluntary decision as mundane as what to have for dinner tonight.
Had the court in Munn or Williams looked to cases like Pierce, the court in either
case would have seen that the doctrine has been extended to other quasi-voluntary
actions of a plaintiff. Even though brain research concludes that we are genetically
predisposed to make some religious decisions the way we do, there is no doubt that
all of the brain research in the world will not erase the concept of free will anytime
soon. But these courts failed to see how “voluntary” one’s actions are does not act as
an absolute bar to recovery when thoroughly examining the pre-existing condition
doctrine.
Either court would look foolish if it turned its nose at the pre-existing condition
doctrine in ways it did not recognize. For example, is it not free will that engages a
person to spend three grueling years in law school and most of their personal life to
build a successful partnership in a law firm? Suppose the landlord of the law firm’s
office negligently operated the elevator and the doors opened without the
preoccupied lawyer noticing the shaft gaping before him. Would these courts
decrease the lawyer's damages for lost wages when he falls to a career-ending injury,
simply because the lawyer could have settled for a life as a bartender? By
concluding that pre-existing conditions should only be physical, the courts in Munn
and Williams would seemingly preclude this lawyer from recovering an award from
the negligent party that would make him whole because his choice to become a
lawyer required an award for lost wages to be higher than it would have been
otherwise. It seems highly unlikely these courts would not take the lawyer as it finds
him.
Furthermore, if the courts in Munn and Williams are unwavering in their
“physical condition” requirement, the scientific research on genetics is a thin rope to
hold on with, but it is there, nonetheless. Future research will most likely strengthen
this “golden thread.”
B. Government Recognition of the Conscientious Objector
Government can recognize that individuals hold religious beliefs that prevent
them from engaging in certain activities, and it even attempts to discern which of our
citizens do so. The Universal Military Training and Service Act “exempts from
combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States those persons
who by reason of their religious training and belief are conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form.”257 It allows courts to consider religious beliefs part
of the individual—inseparable. Essentially, the examiner in such a situation
considers the individual in just the same way a court does when dealing with a
person with a pre-existing condition.
United States v. Seeger gave instruction to the examiner that finds himself in the
unenviable position of determining whether the objector’s belief was “sincere,
the “eggshell skull” doctrine only applies to pre-existing physical injuries. See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 150, at 291.
256
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honest, and made in good faith.”258 Just as the honesty of any witness in any case
must be discerned, the Court directed the examiner to look to the circumstances at
hand to determine if the beliefs a registrant professed were sincerely held.259 In this
particular case, the sincerity of the applicant was not in question; his record as a
Roman Catholic, his humanitarian community service activities, and his studies
provided sufficient evidence.260 The Williams Court balked at the prospect of having
to make such a decision, claiming that to do so would be impermissible.261 This
court clearly missed the point that the only inquiry it should have made was into
whether the plaintiff sincerely held the beliefs upon which she based her acts and
omissions.
To illustrate how a court could make such an inquiry, consider a plaintiff like
Munn. The plaintiff claims to hold beliefs typical of the Jehovah’s Witness faith.
The tenets of the Jehovah’s Witness faith are readily discernable from the group’s
official website, so this plaintiff would have it easy showing a court what he
believed—it is conveniently available in pre-printed form. Church membership
records would likely offer supporting evidence that the plaintiff adhered to these
beliefs. Furthermore, as a Jehovah’s Witness, he could present his medical
emergency card that explains that he does not wish to partake in blood products. A
fact-finder could easily take into consideration all of this information to determine
whether the plaintiff sincerely held the beliefs. Taking this plaintiff as it finds him,
with these personal beliefs, the court would hold the defendant liable for the
plaintiff’s injury because of this pre-existing state.262
C. Treating Religion as a Pre-Existing Condition Passes Constitutional Muster
As in Munn and Williams, future cases will inevitably bring a constitutional
challenge from the defense for violations of the Establishment Clause. Plaintiffs
should rest assured that considering religious beliefs as a pre-existing condition will
pass constitutional muster.
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The case of Friedman v. New York, 282 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1967), is a perfect
example of how a court should address the situation. In this case, a Jewish girl who was raised
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religious beliefs even though other Witnesses did not. See supra text accompanying note 143.
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1. The Ballard Test Met
By considering religious beliefs as part and parcel of the plaintiff, courts will
avoid the danger of conflicting testimony about the “correctness” of beliefs. As in
Seeger, the proper inquiry will only be into whether the plaintiff is acting in
compliance with his own personal beliefs and interpretation of religion.
This investigation is certainly not a question of reasonableness of the plaintiff’s
beliefs, as Ballard plainly prohibits.263 It is clearly reasonable that one takes actions
to avoid a loss one sincerely believes to be the greater evil. The plaintiff still acts
reasonably, as mitigation of damages requires: he acts given his “condition,” the
same standard anyone else with a pre-existing condition is held to.264 This rule is in
accordance with the current rule that what is reasonable is judged by the particular
circumstances of each case.265
2. The Smith and Sherbert Tests Met
In Smith, the United States Supreme Court determined that the Sherbert test is
reserved for situations that call for individualized assessment of a plaintiff’s
conduct.266 Allowing courts to recognize a plaintiff’s religious beliefs as a preexisting condition satisfies this mandate. By providing this protection for all
religions, even those that are unperceivable to the majority, the pre-existing
condition doctrine does not offend the Establishment Clause.
This approach also respects the Free Exercise Clause. When a court considers a
plaintiff’s religious beliefs as a pre-existing condition, it must confront whether
forcing the plaintiff to be responsible for what it normally considers a reasonable
mitigation tactic imposes a burden on the free exercise of the plaintiff’s rights.
Montgomery already clearly held that the government’s interest in “preserving the
life and health of [its] citizens” pales in comparison to its infringement upon First
Amendment Rights.267 Therefore, considering a plaintiff’s religious beliefs as a preexisting condition fits easily in line with Sherbert.
Considering religious beliefs to be a pre-existing state of the plaintiff poses an
acceptable solution to the current inconsistencies in the law regarding judgment on
factually similar cases regardless of the forum in which they are brought—criminal
or civil, state action or private. Courts already have the ability to discern the
sincerity of a person’s beliefs. Moreover, they also have the tools to do so in a
fashion that does not offend the Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
The hallowed rights of the First Amendment define America and have made this
country what it is today. The current approach to tort damage cases is offensive to
these rights, for it forces plaintiffs into a situation where they must choose between
263
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their freedom to exercise or coercion into conformity with the majority’s beliefs to
receive just compensation for their injuries. Courts have the cases before them.
They can continue to ignore the tools in their chambers of justice that would end
religious discrimination in this matter, or they can pick these tools up and put them
to good use protecting these invaluable rights.
Considering religious beliefs as a pre-existing condition is not a foolproof
solution to the discrimination that is evident in the current state of the law, but a
court faces a degree of uncertainty whenever there are issues of fact to be decided.
To err on the side that promotes the most protection of religious beliefs is what the
First Amendment demands of courts because of the importance of the freedoms
protected therein.
Because there can be an infinite variety of religious beliefs professed, a system
must be in place that can handle all possibilities, as not all cases presented to a factfinder will entail easily recognizable religions with well-established beliefs. The
position asserted by this note merely requires courts to continue doing what they
have already done in cases like Seeger and Ballard where the Supreme Court had to
determine whether the defendant sincerely held his religious beliefs. Moreover, the
large majority of cases that will continue to present themselves will undoubtedly be
very similar to those addressed earlier in this note. Most future cases will not
involve some obscure religion where the plaintiff represents the entire membership.
Rather, these cases will involve members of religious sects that profess clear, wellknown beliefs that courts can easily evaluate for their sincerity. Furthermore, it
seems unlikely that a plaintiff would allow himself to suffer or even die unless he is
firmly convicted in his beliefs. Accordingly, the potential for abuse in these
situations is very slim.
Americans highly regard their freedom but “freedom to differ is not limited to
things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test
of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing
order.”268
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Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910, 918 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (Rosenberger J.,
dissenting) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
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